In recent years, governments throughout the world have expressed growing interest in cooperative approaches to environmental protection, including negotiated rulemaking, flexible approaches to enforcement, and voluntary codes and agreements. It is often argued that cooperative approaches are more cost effective, more conducive to innovation, and better able to promote fundamental attitudinal change than traditional "command and control" regulation. However, the overly broad term "cooperative approaches" fails to acknowledge fundamental differences among these novel policies, including distinctions between mandatory and voluntary programs and between those that involve bipartite negotiations between government and business and those that invite participation by a broader range of interests. This ar ticle analyzes these cooperative approaches first by offering a framework to distinguish among various cooperative policy instruments. Second, the article critically examines theoretical arguments and empirical evidence concerning one class of cooperative approaches, voluntary challenges and agreements. The most striking finding is how little we know about the effectiveness of voluntary approaches. This is a function not only of the quite recent experience with these approaches, but also of more fundamental inattention to program evaluation and obstacles to evaluation inherent in voluntary programs. The article concludes with a call for a more rigorous program of research to examine the effectiveness of the new policy instruments and to compare them with traditional regulation and market-based incentives.
Introduction
In the past decade, governments throughout the world have expressed growing interest in more flexible cooperative approaches to environmental protection. In the United States, this trend can be viewed as a reaction against the uniquely conflictual American approach to environmental regulation. This perspective is reflected in U.S. President Clinton's statement that
The adversarial approach that has often characterized our environmental system precludes opportunities for creative solutions that a more collaborative system might encourage. When decision-making is shared, people can bridge differences, find common ground, and identify new solutions. To reinvent environmental protection, we must first build trust among traditional adversaries (Clinton and Gore 1995) .
Interestingly, there is also renewed interest in cooperative policy instruments in countries such as the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Japan, where environmental regulation has traditionally been relatively cooperative Brickman et al. 1985) . Thus, the European Union's Fifth Action Plan (European Commission 1996) states that Whereas previous environmental measures tended to be prescriptive in character with an emphasis on the "thou shalt not" approach, the new strategy leans more towards a "let's work together" approach. This reflects the growing realization in industry and in the business world that not only is industry a significant part of the (environmental) problem but it must also be part of the solution. The new approach implies, in particular, a reinforcement of the dialogue with industry and the encouragement, in appropriate circumstances, of voluntary agreements and other forms of self-regulation.
Many within the emerging field of industrial ecology see a link between cooperative approaches to environmental policy and the crucial role of the private firm in environmental quality. Graedel and Allenby in their textbook on industrial ecology emphasize that " [T] he private corporation, as the expert in its technology, needs to become a partner in the development of new regulatory regimes" (1995, 67) . This statement resonates with Robert Socolow's (1994, 12) statement that "In industrial ecology, industry becomes a policy-maker, not a policy-taker." Cooperative approaches to environmental policy emphasize the valuable expertise residing in the business community and thus take seriously Socolow's call to view the industrial firm as an "agent of change" rather than the "culprit" responsible for environmental degradation. Further, many policy instruments of particular interest to industrial ecology-covenants, extended producer responsibility, ecolabeling, and so on-rely to varying degrees on cooperation and voluntariness. Finally, some have speculated that voluntary approaches may be particularly amenable to forging collaborative networks across the product life cycle (EEA 1997) .
Clearly, the term "cooperative approaches" to environmental protection encompasses a wide variety of approaches, from more flexible enforcement of regulations to voluntary agreements, with much in between. The first objective of this article is to provide a conceptual framework to distinguish among policy instruments predicated on cooperation between government and nongovernmental actors. 1 The second is to focus on a subset of those approaches, voluntary agreements between government and business, and to examine theoretical arguments and empirical evidence concerning their effectiveness.
The article concludes that little empirical evidence exists concerning the environmental benefits of voluntary agreements. This is attributable, in part, to the recent nature of these policy reforms. However, the paucity of empirical evaluations also reflects more fundamental challenges in evaluating voluntary programs, which are characterized by self-selection and voluntary reporting and by an inadequate commitment to program evaluation by advocates of voluntary programs.
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E "Command and Control" versus Cooperation
As noted above, interest in cooperative approaches arises in large part from disenchantment with "command and control" regulation. The command and control model of uniform mandatory standards has been subject to a litany of criticisms. It has been argued that uniform standards are economically inefficient, that development and revision of formal regulations are unnecessarily slow (Nash and Ehrenfeld 1997) , and that command and control regulation encourages end-of-pipe solutions rather than pollution prevention (Georg 1994) . Command and control regulation has also been criticized for specifying technologies rather than performance standards, thus stifling innovation and increasing costs to business; for failure to provide incentives for firms to go beyond compliance (Nash and Ehrenfeld 1997) ; and for a fragmented media-specific, pollutant-specific, and sector-specific approach (Powers and Chertow 1997) . And finally, it is often argued that command and control regulation is unnecessarily adversarial and legalistic (Beardsley et al. 1997) .
These are serious critiques indeed, although it should be noted that not all are uncontroversial. For instance, many argue that regulation is an important stimulus for, rather than impediment to, innovation (Ashford 1997) . More importantly, analysts of environmental policy must be wary of the tendency to use the term "command and control" as a pejorative catchall for any and all criticisms of environmental regulation, because the term denies important differences among regulatory approaches and contexts. For instance, there is nothing inherent in the policy instrument of regulation (broadly defined as rules of behavior backed by sanctions legitimately available to government) that requires regulators to specify control techniques or to limit their focus to individual media, nor is the regulatory process in other countries as adversarial and litigious as in the United States. By the same token, one must resist the temptation to embrace equally diverse cooperative approaches as a panacea for all that ails regulation. As discussed below, many cooperative approaches that have been adopted in recent years are, in fact, regulatory. Moreover, cooperative approaches do not necessarily avoid media or technology specificity.
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It is also important to acknowledge that to some degree interest in cooperative approaches may have little to do with the effectiveness of regulation in achieving environmental objectives. Governments routinely balance multiple policy objectives in choosing policy instruments. The choice of cooperative approaches thus may be driven more by concerns about the impacts of inflexible regulations on industrial competitiveness than by a desire to achieve a higher level of environmental protection. Alternatively, governments placing a high priority on deficit reduction may embrace voluntary cooperative approaches simply because they can no longer afford to pursue regulatory programs in the face of budgetary restraint. The evaluation of the effectiveness of voluntary approaches in the latter half of this article will thus consider multiple policy objectives of protecting the environment, cost effectiveness for both government and business, and democratic accountability and participation.
It is also noteworthy that the emphasis on cooperative approaches may in part reflect their political popularity rather than administrative effectiveness (Baggott 1986, 59 ). Politicians may embrace cooperative nonregulatory approaches because they are unwilling to impose the costs of regulation on powerful business interests . The fact that cooperative approaches can be adopted for reasons that have little to do with environmental or other policy objectives (other than reelection) provides all the more reason to carefully evaluate the effectiveness of these new approaches to environmental protection.
Defining Cooperation
It is important to clarify at the outset just what is meant by "cooperation," because the term is likely to have different meaning from different perspectives. The Oxford Concise Dictionary defines cooperation as "working together to the same end" (Allen 1990) . Several aspects of this definition warrant closer examination. First is the
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E
implicit question of just who is "working together." Many cooperative approaches that have emerged in recent years focus on partnerships between business and government, to the exclusion of other parties. Such approaches may enhance government cooperation with one group at the expense of conflict with others, such as environmentalists, who may resent exclusion or have substantive objections to agreements reached between government and business. One person's cooperation thus may be another's conflict. Consistent with recent policy developments, this article focuses on approaches that promote cooperation between business and government, although other parties may be involved as well.
A second element of the definition of cooperation concerns commonality of objectives. Cooperation is predicated on some measure of agreement or consent. However, when one is considering agreements between government and nongovernmental interests, the nature of that consent requires closer examination. This is because government, unlike private actors, has legitimate authority to coerce others (subject of course to constitutional limitations) (Stanbury 1993, 53) . This raises the question of whether business-government agreement with respect to environmental policy constitutes genuine cooperation, in the same way as one might question whether handing over one's wallet to an armed assailant constitutes cooperation. Bearing this in mind, one can envision various cooperative approaches situated along a continuum that varies in the extent of explicit or implied government coercion. From a practical perspective, the issue is that some approaches to public policy are more cooperative than others. The following section revisits this notion of a continuum in offering a simple typology of cooperative approaches.
The third element of the definition of cooperation is "working together." Government and business may collaborate in devising or implementing policies, or both. It is questionable, however, whether a government's choice not to intervene at all can be considered a form of business-government cooperation. Although the government's deference to the private sector suggests tacit agreement with respect to objectives, government and business are not "working together" in any way.
A Typology of Cooperative Approaches
One of the most straightforward typologies of policy instruments is that offered by Doern and Phidd (1992) who argue that governments choose among five broad classes of policy tools:
• Regulation (legal requirements backed by government sanctions); • Government enterprise (direct provision of goods and services by either government agencies or government-owned enterprises); • Expenditure; • Exhortation; • Inaction
In terms of the familiar analogy of how to get a donkey to pull a cart, these policy instruments correspond to using a stick to coerce the donkey (regulation), the driver pulling the cart herself (government enterprise), inducing the donkey to move with carrots (expenditure), encouraging the donkey through ear stroking and persuasion (exhortation), and leaving it up to whomever want the goods in the cart to work out their own arrangements with the donkey (government inaction).
These categories are, of course, not as simple as they seem. There is a broad range of tools within each category. Moreover, as noted above, there can also be a fine line between informal persuasion and formal regulation, because a donkey that has felt the stick in the past may respond to ear stroking less out of good will than fear. However, this typology nonetheless offers a useful starting point to distinguish among the variety of cooperative approaches to environmental protection that have emerged in recent years.
The vast majority of cooperative reforms fall into the three categories of regulation, exhortation, and government inaction. Assuming comparable policy objectives, these three classes of policy instruments can be placed along a continuum of coerciveness from regulation to exhortation to government inaction (Doern and Phidd 1992) , although with considerable variation within each category. 3 The following discussion reviews recent reforms in each of these categories, from most to least coercive.
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Regulation: Kinder, Gentler Sticks
Compliance Support
Many cooperative reforms adopted in recent years are adaptations to traditional regulation. For instance, although mandatory compliance with regulations is still the norm, regulators in many jurisdictions are increasingly willing to assist regulated interests by clarifying requirements and providing technical advice on how to achieve compliance. Such programs are increasingly popular among the U.S. states (Arrandale 1996) , particularly as the reach of regulatory programs extends to increasingly small enterprises, which have fewer resources to devote to legal and environmental affairs.
Flexible Approaches to Compliance
A substantial body of literature argues that greater rates of compliance can be achieved by a cooperative and flexible approach to enforcement than an adversarial one (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Bardach and Kagan 1982; Scholz 1991) . Proponents of cooperative enforcement argue that although frequent resort to the stick may compel greater compliance among firms inclined to evade the law, it risks destroying the good will of a much larger number of law-abiding firms, who resent being treated like criminals. Such firms may respond with perfunctory compliance with the narrow letter of the law rather than public-spirited efforts to comply with the intent of the law. At worst, a "culture of resistance" may emerge, in which firms help each other identify and exploit loopholes in regulations (Bardach and Kagan 1982) . Proponents of cooperative enforcement advocate a "tit for tat" strategy of initial forgiveness combined with increasingly stringent sanctions in the face of recalcitrant behavior (Scholz 1991; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992) .
A critical assumption underlying this argument is that there are more "good apples" than "bad apples" (Bardach and Kagan 1982) . However, other scholars adopt an assumption consistent with public choice and neoclassical economic theory that virtually all firms are "bad apples" motivated exclusively by profits and thus inclined to comply with regulations only if anticipated sanctions outweigh the financial benefits of noncompliance. Quantitative comparisons of actual rates of compliance in response to different enforcement regimes are few and conflicting (Scholz 1991; Burby and Paterson 1993, Harrison 1995) . Despite this, there has been growing attention to a variety of reforms to promote flexible and cooperative enforcement, including
• Reduced compliance monitoring for firms with certified environmental management systems; • Guarantees of confidentiality for self-audits, with reduction or waiver of penalties in the event of voluntary disclosure and correction of noncompliance (Arrandale 1997 ); • Negotiated compliance agreements, which waive enforcement actions in exchange for a firm's commitment to a program to achieve compliance; • Variances from regulatory requirements for firms pursuing innovative control strategies.
Cooperative Development of Regulatory Standards
The discussion thus far has concerned more cooperative ways to implement regulations. However, cooperation can also be extended to development of regulations in the first place. Cooperative standards development can take a variety of forms.
First, the number of participants in cooperative standard setting can vary. In Canada, Japan, and European countries with corporatist traditions of developing policies in concert with key interests, environmental standards have traditionally been set through bipartite negotiation with the regulated industry (Vogel 1986; Brickman et al. 1985; Harrison and Hoberg 1994) . Amid criticisms from excluded groups, some countries are now turning to multipartite processes. In Canada, "multistakeholder consultations" have become the norm in environmental standard setting at the federal level (Hoberg 1993) . The approach is similar to negotiated rulemaking in the United States (Harter 1982; Coglianese 1997 ). The U.S. Common Sense Initiative also attempted to achieve consensus among diverse interests on new approaches to
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environmental regulation (U.S. GAO 1997) . The number of participants in cooperative rulemaking thus can range from two to several dozen, with obvious implications for the speed, cost, and likelihood of agreement.
Mechanisms for public involvement in regulatory decision making also differ in the weight given to input from nongovernmental actors and the emphasis placed on consensus. When input is viewed as simply advisory to government decision makers, as in notice and comment rulemaking, there is no need for a single recommendation to emerge from nongovernmental participants. However, if there is a presumption that participants' recommendations will carry considerable weight, mechanisms to bring diverse societal interests together and to resolve their differences are more important. Regulatory negotiations often rely on a decision rule of consensus, although this has been criticized by some as overly resistant to change. 
Exhortation: Talking with the Donkey
Governments can seek to persuade individuals or firms to change their behavior in a variety of ways. Although such approaches are nominally voluntary, in that no formal legal requirement is applied, they vary in degree of coerciveness. Closest to regulation along the spectrum of coercion are "voluntary agreements" between business and industry and government-sponsored codes of conduct. Voluntary agreements, such as the Dutch covenants discussed below, are characterized by strong expectations on the part of government that industry will comply. Such agreements are typically accompanied by an explicit or implied threat of regulation or other mandatory instruments should voluntary measures fail. Voluntary agreements or codes are usually negotiated by government and the private sector. Although many agreements take the form of nonbinding "gentlemen's agreements," others are legally binding contracts. Such contracts can still be considered voluntary, however, in the sense that the parties consent to assume certain obligations, in contrast to laws and regulations, which apply equally to all regardless of consent.
In contrast to voluntary agreements, governmental efforts to persuade target groups to change their behavior via "voluntary challenges" involve little or no arm-twisting in the form of threats of regulation or penalties for nonparticipation. Requirements of participation tend to be very flexible. Examples of these less coercive voluntary challenge programs include the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) 33/50 program and Environment Canada's Accelerated Reduction/Elimination of Toxics program (ARET), discussed below.
The least coercive approaches in this category are education and information dissemination programs, which may be directed at either the business community or consumers. Here, government does not explicitly encourage particular actions but does so implicitly by providing particular kinds of information to influence consumers' or firms' behavior. Examples of educational programs seeking to influence business include pollution prevention clearinghouses that provide information about pollution prevention techniques, while efforts to inform consumers include environmental awards for businesses and government-sponsored ecolabeling programs.
Government Inaction: Leaving the Donkey Alone
The final policy tool is for government to do nothing, leaving it to civil society to address a given environmental problem. Government coercion may still be a factor in this category, as when an implied threat of coercion causes actors to change their behavior in anticipation of government intervention, although in other cases the objectives of governmental and nongovernmental actors may fortuitously coincide. Approaches in this category, including the Forest Stewardship Council, the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) Principles, Responsible Care, and International Standards Organization (ISO) 14000, essentially parallel the exhortation programs discussed above but with some entity other than government doing the educating or persuading. Programs in this category tend to rely on cooperation among nongovernmental actors rather than between government and business, and thus are not examined in detail in this article.
S TAT E O F T H E D E B AT E Talking with the Donkey
The remainder of the article considers the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of one subset of the forgoing cooperative approaches, those relying on exhortation. Approaches within this category are of particular interest because they represent the strongest examples of government-business cooperation. In contrast, cooperative regulatory approaches involve greater government coercion, whereas cooperative private sector approaches do not involve active government-business collaboration. Because Salzman's review of ecolabeling provides a recent discussion of the information dissemination approach (Salzman 1997) , the discussion here focuses on voluntary challenges and agreements.
Evaluation
Before turning to evaluation of voluntary programs, some commentary on criteria for evaluation is warranted. Although it is fairly obvious that evaluation of an environmental policy instrument should consider its effectiveness in achieving environmental objectives, policymakers routinely consider other criteria as well. Consistent with the scope of the theoretical arguments concerning voluntary programs discussed below, the analysis here focuses on environmental benefits, cost effectiveness for government and business, and democratic accountability and participation.
A critical question concerns the appropriate baseline against which to measure performance. Although command and control regulation tends to be criticized against standards of full attainment of environmental goals and optimal cost effectiveness, there is a tendency for proponents of voluntary programs to hail any accomplishments above the current baseline as a success. This may be quite appropriate if the voluntary program is the only alternative to the status quo under consideration. However, to the extent that voluntary and regulatory programs are being considered as substitutes, the relevant question is how they compare with each other in practice.
One can, in fact, consider several different levels of analysis of environmental effectiveness (EEA 1997) . The first, and simplest to achieve, is a measure of the impact of a policy or program relative to the reference situation. In other words, what benefits have been achieved relative to some base year? A second and more rigorous standard is to ask to what degree those benefits are in fact attributable to the program in question. This standard acknowledges that firms' behavior might have changed anyway in response to other factors, including market forces and other government policies. This standard necessitates development of a "business-asusual" baseline that would have prevailed in the absence of the policy. Finally, the third and most difficult standard of analysis is to compare the chosen policy with alternative policies. It is notoriously difficult to establish the counterfactual "what would have happened if." However, comparisons of the effectiveness of the alternative policy instrument in other policy areas or other jurisdictions may yield insights.
Theoretical Advantages of Voluntary Approaches
A voluntary program will only be agreed to if all parties to the agreement perceive benefits to participation. This section thus considers in turn the theoretical benefits of voluntary approaches from the perspectives of both government and business. The theoretical advantages (and disadvantages) of voluntary approaches relative to regulation from government's perspective can be grouped in terms of three broad policy goals: reducing environmental impacts, increasing cost effectiveness for government and business, and promoting democratic values of accountability and participation.
Reducing Environmental Impacts
One oft-cited advantage of negotiated voluntary agreements is that they take advantage of business expertise and thus can incorporate better solutions to environmental problems. Indeed, a key rationale behind the Dutch covenants approach was the government's belief that it simply did not have the expertise to specify via regulation what industry should do to achieve long-term national environmental objectives. Voluntary approaches thus take seriously Socolow's advice to involve industry as a
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full partner in policymaking. Georg (1994) argues that voluntary agreements are particularly well suited to pollution prevention, which can only succeed by relying on industry's knowledge of what goes on inside its facilities.
Critics of voluntary approaches view government's partnership with industry with skepticism, however. Many have argued that government limits itself unnecessarily by pursuing only measures to which industry consents, particularly because such measures may not be sufficient to achieve societal environmental objectives (Hajer 1994) . As Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, 55) note, "The very conditions that foster the evolution of cooperation are also the conditions that promote the evolution of capture and indeed corruption." Similarly, Rennings and colleagues (1997, 253) argues that "once the government commits itself to a corporatist style of environmental policy, the other negotiating partner is granted a potential to delay and water down goals that should not be underestimated."
A second way that voluntary programs might advance environmental objectives is through development of networks that provide opportunities for technology transfer and sharing of environmental expertise within the business community (Georg 1994) . Voluntary networks can be used to forge links not only within sectors but across the product chain. The flexibility and emphasis on collaborative networks of voluntary agreements may render them particularly well suited to approaches that cross media and span the life cycle (EEA 1997) .
The risk, however, is that sectoral or crosssectoral business networks will use the opportunity to participate in policymaking to collectively resist environmental change, as they often have with respect to ecolabeling (Salzman 1997; Udo de Haes 1997) . The voluntary nature of participation in business networks also raises the specter of "free ridership." Free riding occurs when firms either decline to participate in a voluntary program or participate but fail to adhere to their voluntary commitments. The temptation to free ride can be great if a firm can gain the benefits of participation, whether withdrawal of proposed regulations or improved public image, without changing its own behavior. Free riders are not only problematic because some fraction of firms fail to take desired actions to protect the environment, but also because their failure to do so may undermine the commitment of those firms initially inclined to participate.
Some have argued that the flexibility and collaboration offered by voluntary approaches can foster innovation, which many in the industrial ecology community have posited to be critical to long-term environmental improvement (Graedel and Allenby 1995, 8) . Others, however, assert that voluntary agreements present a weaker stimulus for innovation than performance-based regulation, which mandates compliance from all sources (Friends of the Earth 1995; Clark 1995) . Koppen (1994) among others has argued that implementation will be smoother and rates of compliance higher, thus yielding environmental benefits, because firms "buy in" to voluntary agreements. Various arguments also have been made about "soft effects" of voluntary approaches (EEA 1997). For instance, many authors have stressed that voluntary agreements improve relations between business and government. Although for the purposes of this article cooperation is not considered an end in itself, an improvement in business-government relations could have environmental and economic benefits by redirecting resources, energy, and ideas from conflict to solutions. It has also been suggested that consistent with the paradigm of sustainable development, voluntary approaches inculcate norms of shared responsibility and encourage integration of environmental concerns in business decision making (European Commission 1996) .
Cost Effectiveness
Voluntary approaches are less costly than regulation from government's perspective because industry bears the costs of monitoring and shares the costs of standards development. The flexibility of voluntary approaches, particularly with respect to timing of introduction of environmental measures, also promises greater cost effectiveness for business than inflexible regulation.
Democratic Accountability and Participation
Although proponents of voluntary approaches applaud government's inclusion of
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business as a partner in policymaking, critics have raised a number of concerns about democratic accountability. Environmentalists argue that the purported ease with which voluntary approaches can be negotiated and implemented owes much to their operation beyond the procedural safeguards of administrative law, thus reducing opportunities for participation by third parties. Concerns have also been raised that there are insufficient opportunities for involvement by democratically elected legislatures when the executive relies on informal agreements and contracts rather than statutory authority to achieve its environmental objectives (Bastmeijer 1997; Baggott 1986 ).
Attractions from Business's Perspective
The preceding discussion considered benefits of voluntary programs from government's perspective. The prospective benefits of participation in a voluntary program from industry's perspective will differ depending on whether or not the industry has financial incentives to pursue environmental objectives (Storey 1996) . Market incentives to protect the environment may be direct, in the form of cost savings from waste reduction, or indirect, in the form of reduced liability, reduced insurance premiums, greater access to capital from anxious investors, or increased sales to environmentally conscious consumers. A firm facing such incentives is likely to improve its environmental performance regardless of government programs. However, voluntary programs nonetheless may enhance opportunities to profit from environmental measures (assuming the benefits outweigh the transaction costs of participation). Through sharing of expertise and technology transfer, government may be able to help firms overcome barriers to achieve the full market potential of waste reductions and energy efficiency improvements (Storey 1996) . Government recognition of industry's voluntary efforts may enhance the credibility of the firm's own environmental claims with consumers. And finally, even a firm committed to similar environmental objectives as the government may wish to avoid inflexible regulations.
When a firm does not have market incentives to improve its environmental performance, its motives for participation in a voluntary program will primarily be a function of government behavior. In this case, the challenge for government is not to enhance existing incentives but to create them. This may be done by offering direct incentives for participation in voluntary programs in the form of subsidies or tax expenditures (Davies and Mazurek 1996) . More often, the incentives for business lie in avoiding burdensome regulations. Therein lies the paradox of a cooperative voluntary approach: A coercive government is often a necessary prerequisite for cooperative agreements (Glachant 1994, 47) . A critical question for voluntary agreements driven by the threat of regulation is whether the appeal of voluntarism from business's perspective lies merely in reduced reporting requirements or greater flexibility, or whether reduced costs are a result of weaker standards.
Voluntary Challenges
This section considers evidence concerning the costs and benefits of two voluntary challenge programs, the U.S. EPA's 33/50 program and Canada's ARET program, and of various European negotiated voluntary agreements.
The U.S. 33/50 Program
In 1991, the U.S. EPA challenged the business community to voluntarily reduce its releases and transfers of 17 high priority chemicals by 33% by the end of 1992 and 50% by the end of 1995, dubbing its challenge program "33/50." In terms of the typology presented above, the 33/50 program is an example of a voluntary challenge program. The goals were simple and uniform across all sectors. Indeed, the simplicity of the program was one of its attractions. To participate, a firm needed only to write to the EPA pledging some reductions of the 33/50 chemicals. In turn, the EPA would provide a certificate of appreciation and recognize 33/50 participants in its annual report on the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). Incentives to participate thus were exclusively positive; there were no penalties for nonparticipation or for failure to achieve commitments.
The relationship of the 33/50 program with the TRI was significant. TRI is a regulatory program that mandates public reporting of waste re-
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leases and transfers, although it does not mandate reductions of those releases or transfers. To the extent that it encourages voluntary reductions of discharges, it is through the negative mechanism of community pressure and bad public relations. The EPA consciously sought to complement this negative incentive with a positive inducement of recognition through the 33/50 program.
Only 16% of firms contacted by EPA agreed to participate, although a higher rate of participation was achieved among larger companies with greater discharges (Davies and Mazurek 1996) . Despite this, evaluation of the program relative to the reference year is encouraging. The goal of 33% reduction was achieved one year early, by the end of 1991, and the 50% reduction goal was also achieved early, by the end of 1994. However, when one applies a stricter standard of evaluation, whether reductions were achieved relative to a "business as usual" baseline, the benefits of the 33/50 program are not as clear.
The first concern is that the reported reductions in discharges and transfers include those made by firms that chose not to participate in the program. As reported in table 1, these reductions constitute one quarter of all reductions of 33/50 chemicals between 1988 and 1994. It seems highly unlikely that reductions by nonparticipants were motivated by the program. A second problem lies in the fact that when the program was launched in early 1991, EPA chose 1988 as the reference year, because it was the most recent year for which TRI data were available. That made it possible for firms to claim reductions under the 33/50 program made before its inception. An evaluation of the program by the environmental nonprofit organization, INFORM (1995, 498-9) concluded that one-third of participating firms in fact pledged only what they had already done. The data in table 1 indicate that one-third or more of the 51% reductions achieved between 1988 and 1994 occurred before the program's inception in 1991.
5 Clearly, such reductions cannot be attributed to the 33/50 challenge. Moreover, the factors that caused firms to reduce their releases before 1991 may have continued to influence their behavior after the 33/50 program was launched. In particular, it is difficult to separate the negative publicity associated with the TRI program from the positive reinforcement offered by 33/50.
The INFORM study also expressed concern that reductions were achieved primarily through recycling, end-of-pipe measures, and energy recovery rather than source reduction (INFORM 1995, 499) . This is noteworthy in light of the claim that the 33/50 program is a success story of pollution prevention (Anderson 1994 ) and the more general argument that voluntary programs are particularly well suited to pollution prevention. 
There is, however, circumstantial evidence that 33/50 encouraged firms to make reductions over and above what they would have made otherwise. As the data in table 1 indicate, releases and transfers of the 17 33/50 chemicals fell by 42% from 1990 (the year before the program was launched) to 1994, compared with a 22% reduction of non-33/50 chemicals in the TRI inventory over the same period (Davies and Mazurek 1996, 15) . (However, the fact that releases and transfers of non-33/50 chemicals fell by a greater percent than those for 33/50 chemicals before 1991 suggests a possible "water balloon" effect [Arora and Cason 1995] , with the 33/50 program merely redirecting firms' efforts from one set of chemicals to another.) Moreover, the data in table 1 indicate that firms participating in the 33/50 program reduced their discharges of the 33/50 chemicals by more than nonparticipating firms did, 49% from 1990 to 1994 as compared with 30% for nonparticipating firms. This 19% difference in reductions by participating firms constitutes an 11% reduction relative to the total releases and transfers of 33/50 chemicals in the 1990 reference year.
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One can question even this remaining 11% reduction. The potential for self-selection is problematic in evaluating any voluntary program. Firms already inclined to make reductions of 33/50 chemicals, whether in response to TRI publicity, market forces, or other factors, simply may have been the ones to sign on for credit. This is supported by Arora and Cason's (1996) finding that the larger a firm's releases and transfers, the more likely it was to participate in 33/50, because these are the firms that would be expected to respond most aggressively to release of TRI data in the absence of the 33/50 program. Thus, the fact that 33/50 participants made greater reductions than nonparticipants does not necessarily indicate that those reductions were in fact prompted by the 33/50 program. It is problematic that none of the analyses discussed above controlled for the effects of concurrent regulations. Arora and Cason (1996) note that two of the 33/50 chemicals were being phased out by regulations concerning ozone-depleting substances. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments also mandated further regulation of discharges of volatile organic compounds (to achieve ground level ozone objectives) and hazardous air pollutants, both of which could be expected to cover all 17 33/50 chemicals.
7 This potential influence of regulation is also supported by O'Toole and colleagues' (1997) finding that state level discharges of 33/50 chemicals were strongly correlated with the stringency of state toxics regulation. Thus, it is not known to what degree the apparent success of the voluntary 33/50 program is in fact owed to regulation.
The Canadian ARET Program
The Canadian ARET Challenge, launched in 1994, is similar in many respects to the 33/50 program, although more ambitious. Industry is challenged to reduce discharges of 30 chemicals considered to be toxic, persistent, and bioaccumulative by 90% by the year 2000 and of 87 others by 50% by the same year. Characteristic of a voluntary challenge program, there is no threat of penalties for failure to achieve those goals. Indeed, as in 33/50, firms that choose to participate are not required to commit to the full 90% and 50% reductions. However, in contrast to 33/50, the ARET challenge emerged from extensive negotiations with stakeholders.
In 1991, Environment Canada established a multipartite committee to recommend policies to reduce use and discharges of toxic substances. The committee comprised 29 members from industry, government, labor, environmental groups, Aboriginal peoples, and others (Leiss and Associates 1996) . Although the group reached consensus on which substances to target, participants could not agree on two issues: the degree to which pollution prevention rather than discharge reductions should be emphasized and whether regulatory or voluntary approaches should be favored. As a result, environmentalists, labor, and Aboriginal representatives withdrew in protest. The remaining industry and government participants carried on and achieved consensus in early 1994. The resulting ARET Challenge is voluntary and focuses on reducing discharges, the two features to which environmental groups objected.
Only preliminary assessments of the impact of ARET can be made at this time, because only two years of data are available. By the end of 1995, action plans had been received from 278
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facilities in eight industrial sectors, comprising 40% of all Canadian industrial production (ARET 1997). Discharges of ARET substances had already been reduced 49% relative to base year levels, including a 60% reduction of the 30 highest priority substances. Participating facilities have promised an additional 20% overall reduction relative to base year levels by the year 2000. This will surpass the program objective of 50%, although reductions promised by company action plans received to date do not yet meet the 90% reduction target for the subset of highest priority chemicals.
As with 33/50, the degree to which these reductions are attributable to the ARET program is unclear. Similar concerns arise with respect to base year, overlapping regulations, self-selection by industry leaders, and free riding, whereas others are unique to ARET. The base year problem is exacerbated in the ARET case, because each participating facility can pick its own base year anytime after 1987 (Gallon 1998 ). This allows firms to claim credit toward the ARET program for discharge reductions they made as much as six years before the program's inception, and to strategically choose a year with particularly high discharges to maximize apparent reductions. To address this problem, the ARET secretariat has attempted to track reductions since a common base year of 1993 and reports that releases of ARET chemicals were reduced by 19% between 1993 and the end of 1995. 8 This contradicts the program's own claim that "For the most part . . . [the full 49%] reductions are directly attributable to the commitment of ARET participants to this voluntary initiative"(ARET 1997, 1).
As with 33/50, there are also questions about whether the reductions attributed to ARET are in fact voluntary, and if so, whether they are attributable to the program. A survey of participating firms indicated that less than half (47%) believed that participation in ARET had helped them "identify opportunities to significantly reduce toxic emissions" (Roewade 1996, 23) , suggesting that many firms are simply doing what they would have done anyway. No analysis has been done of the extent of regulatory overlap at the federal or provincial level, although anecdotal evidence provides cause for concern that at least some of the reported voluntary reductions are attributable to mandatory measures. 9 In other cases, as with 33/50 and TRI, voluntary reductions may have been driven less by the positive publicity associated with the ARET challenge than the negative publicity associated with mandatory reporting of discharges to Canada's National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI). Because only half of the ARET chemicals are included in the NPRI list, there is an as yet unrealized opportunity for research to compare reductions under ARET of NPRI and non-NPRI chemicals. However, the fact that the ARET list of chemicals does not correspond completely with mandatory reporting under NPRI poses difficulties for the verification of participants' discharge reports. Indeed, the absence of any provisions for third party verification of firms' own claims of discharge reductions has been called the "Achilles heel" of the ARET program (Leiss and Associates 1996) .
Free ridership is less problematic than in the 33/50 program, with an average participation rate of 68% across eight sectors, although this falls short of the rate of participation that one might expect from rigorously enforced regulation or discharge fees. Participation is uneven, ranging from 97% in the chemical sector (where participation in the Responsible Care program is a requirement for membership in the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association) to 46% in the oil and gas sector (Roewade 1996, 6) . The low rate of participation has even led some firms to call for "field leveling regulations" to mandate similar levels of effort from all firms within a sector (Van Nijnatten 1998; Gallon 1998) . Participants account for 83% of all emissions of the NPRI chemicals covered by the ARET program, suggesting, as with 33/50, that nonparticipants tend to be smaller producers (ARET 1995, 2) .
Finally, criticisms have been made about the process from which the ARET Challenge emerged. The fact that the terms of the ARET Challenge resulted from extensive government-industry negotiations does seem to have resulted in higher rates of participation than for the 33/50 program. However, it is noteworthy that industry-government consensus was achieved at the expense of environmentalist, labor, and Aboriginal support, which many be-
lieve has undermined the program's credibility (Van Nijnatten 1998).
Voluntary Agreements
Negotiated voluntary agreements are variously referred to as environmental agreements, codes of conduct, and cooperative management regimes. The interchangeable use of these terms can mask important distinctions within this class of policy instruments. Voluntary agreements differ along several dimensions (Storey 1996 ; European Commission 1997):
• Who participates in development and implementation. Negotiations typically involve government and industry but may also include environmental groups, labor, or others.
• The nature of the commitment. Although most are nonbinding "gentlemen's agreements," some take the form of legally binding contracts, which are enforceable under civil law.
• The relationship to other policy instruments, including subsidies, taxes, and regulations.
• Whether it is the objectives or the means of achieving them that are being negotiated.
Negotiated voluntary agreements have grown dramatically in popularity in Europe since the mid-1980s (EEA 1997 ). An inventory of environmental agreements conducted by the European Commission in 1996 found 305 such agreements among the member countries, although roughly two thirds of those were equally divided between the Netherlands and Germany (European Commission 1997).
The Netherlands Experience
The Dutch "covenants" are arguably the bestknown example of negotiated voluntary agreements. Reliance on negotiated covenants increased in the Netherlands after the first National Environmental Policy Plan in 1989 called for a more cooperative approach to environmental protection in recognition of the shared responsibilities of government and industry. The government negotiates with "target groups" to identify the measures necessary to achieve the objectives set in the national plan. Typically, covenants are negotiated with trade associations, with individual firms subsequently signing on via letters of declaration. To date, far-reaching agreements have been negotiated with 18 sectors responsible for the vast majority of industrial pollution in the Netherlands, although there are dozens of other covenants concerning energy efficiency and other environmental issues (Ministry of Housing 1997; Beardsley et al. 1997) .
Evaluation of the Dutch approach is complicated by considerable variation among covenants within the Netherlands (Bastmeijer 1997) . To some degree, this variation reflects evolution of the approach. The early covenants were criticized for exclusion of third parties and the elected legislature, unclear objectives, and inattention to monitoring. A 1995 study of 154 covenants, including 85 in the environmental field, by the Dutch Auditor General concluded that most lacked sufficient safeguards to ensure effective implementation (Algemene Rekenkamer 1995). In two-thirds of the substantive (as opposed to procedure-oriented) covenants examined, the parties agreed only to strive to achieve their obligations, not to actually achieve them. Deadlines were unclear in half of the cases studied. The Auditor General was also critical of the unclear legal status of many covenants and inadequate justifications provided for the use of covenants as opposed to other policy instruments.
In response, more recent covenants place greater emphasis on clarity of commitments, monitoring requirements, and legal formality (Bastmeijer 1997; Van Zijst 1993) . There are also greater opportunities for third-party involvement, although bipartite negotiation is still the norm and concerns remain about public access to the details of agreements and reports on performance (Biekart 1995; Van Zijst 1993) . Despite the considerable variation among covenants, two unique features of the Netherlands's approach warrant emphasis, particularly because they distinguish the approach from that used in many other countries and thus may limit the applicability of lessons learned from the Dutch covenants to other voluntary programs.
First, it is significant that negotiations take place within the context of national performance
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objectives. The government sets nonnegotiable goals-percentage reductions in discharges, packaging waste, energy use, and so on-and then negotiates the means to achieve those goals with the target groups. The issue is thus "how," not "what." Glachant (1994) offers a compelling theoretical analysis of the importance of this distinction. When collective performance objectives are previously established, government and industry have compatible objectives for negotiations: to find the most cost-effective means to achieve those goals (though Glachant notes that this might be achieved more efficiently through a system of marketable permits than via negotiations). However, when the goals themselves are negotiable, strategic behavior and "capture" by industry are serious threats.
A second distinctive feature, at least of more recent covenants, is that they are legally binding. Recent covenants tend to take the form of legally binding private contracts, with commitments in many cases subsequently being incorporated in statute-based permits (Bastmeijer 1997; OECD 1997) . It is noteworthy, though, that the effort to recognize negotiated commitments in formal permits seems to have been motivated not only to strengthen enforcement of covenants, but to protect negotiated agreements from legal challenges by third parties after the courts failed to uphold some early covenants (Van Zijst 1993, 16; Biekart 1995, 144) . Koppen (1994) argues that the effort to integrate negotiated agreements within the existing framework of environmental laws and to achieve binding commitments is the greatest strength of the Dutch approach, in that it offers the potential to combine the advantages of informal negotiation with those of legal formality.
A 1997 review of progress by the Netherlands government concluded that good progress was being made with respect to most national objectives for the year 2000, with a few notable exceptions, including oxides of nitrogen (NO x ) and carbon dioxide emissions (Ministry of Housing 1997). Government and industry officials both cite greater cooperation and trust as benefits of the approach, and industry officials claim greater cost effectiveness (Beardsley et al. 1997) . The Dutch Ministry of the Environment believes that "Long range covenants (5-10 years) which permit some flexibility over the nature and timing of implementation actions are proving more efficient and effective than direct regulation in many cases" (Ministry of Housing 1997, 18) . It is, however, difficult to assess to what extent the impressive strides toward sustainability being made in the Netherlands are attributable to the covenants approach, as opposed to other concurrent policy reforms, including extension of the permit system to cover virtually all sources, introduction of environmental taxes, and enhanced enforcement.
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Reviews of individual covenants are mixed. Hajer (1994) is critical of the effectiveness of a negotiated agreement to reduce acid rain because reductions in discharges per unit of production have been more than offset by growth in production volume. However, Hajer does not attempt analysis of performance relative to a business as usual baseline or alternative policy instruments. Storey (1996) is more sanguine about the Long Term Agreements to promote energy efficiency, although he estimates that about half of the resulting improvements in energy efficiency would have been achieved under a "business-as-usual" scenario. He also notes that the remaining achievements may be due in large part to supporting regulatory measures to prevent free riding. Biekart (1995, 146 ) offers a critical appraisal of the covenant with the base metals industry, reporting that companies failed to meet 1995 targets and were expected to fall short of their year 2000 targets as well.
Agreement on a packaging covenant was reached in 1991 by the Dutch government and the Foundation on Packaging and the Environment, an association representing some 250 firms in the packaging chain (OECD 1997). However, consensus was achieved only after environmentalists withdrew from the process in protest (Koppen 1994) . OECD (1997) reports that signatories met their targets for 1994 and are on track to achieve targets for the year 2000. No analysis is provided of performance relative to a business-as-usual baseline or counterfactual regulatory or market incentives scenarios. Government and business participants agree that the negotiations were an important learning exer-
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cise (OECD 1997, 28) . The OECD (1997) also concluded that participation by firms across the product chain facilitated a combination of both upstream solutions, such as redesign of packaging, and downstream solutions, such as recycling. Environmentalists, however, are critical that the negotiated measures are insufficiently ambitious and that compliance information is inaccessible (Biekart 1995) . The OECD also notes an unresolved free rider problem.
Other European Experience
Negotiated voluntary agreements are also popular in Germany but take a different form. Although industry and government typically negotiate agreements, because of legal constraints on government participation in private contracts, agreements are written in the form of industry-only codes of conduct (EEA 1997; European Commission 1996) . Threats of regulation, or market-based instruments, or litigation are cited as important motivating factors for negotiations (EEA 1997; Rehnbinder 1994) .
Despite this, several authors who have written on the German agreements are quite critical of their effectiveness. Rennings and colleagues (1997) conclude that agreements concerning climate change and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) yielded only no-regrets measures, which firms would have had incentives to take in the absence of negotiated agreements. The European Environmental Agency (EEA 1997) was also skeptical of the benefits of the declaration on climate change, which involved 19 industrial sectors, concluding that it "runs the risk of achieving little more than an increase in the dissemination of information by the industry associations" (see also European Commission 1997, Annex 5, 22). Storey (1996, 28) concluded that the agreement was actually less ambitious than the business-as-usual scenario.
Rennings and colleagues also conclude that an agreement involving 15 industrial sectors concerning end-of-life vehicles was comparable with the regulatory proposal that launched negotiations four years earlier. A study conducted for the European Commission (1997, Annex 5, 26-7) is even less positive concerning that agreement, stressing that exceptions negotiated by the industry are likely to limit its effectiveness and that the agreement will likely need to be renegotiated as a result. Concern was also expressed that pressure for vertical integration from large automobile manufacturers will undermine the "functioning, highly innovative" disposal and recycling industry.
The European Commission study (1997, Annex 5, 21-8) also reports that German-negotiated agreements have had mixed success in achieving their environmental objectives, although no data on environmental benefits relative to reference year, baseline scenario, or alternative policy instruments are offered. Although agreements to phase out some products, including CFCs, have succeeded, in other cases they have not achieved their goals because consumers have been reluctant to accept the reformulated products. Agreements concerning product-related waste have been less successful; in some cases regulations were eventually adopted in response to noncompliance. Agreements that call for reduction of industrial emissions have also met with mixed success.
A recent study by the European Environmental Agency (1997) is one of the most ambitious evaluations of voluntary agreements to date. The Agency conducted rigorous case studies of six negotiated agreements in order to assess performance relative to the reference year, business-as-usual baseline, and alternative policy instruments. Despite an impressive conceptual and research effort, what is most striking about the EEA study is how little the authors were able to conclude. They were able to confirm environmental improvements relative to the reference year in only two of six cases and relative to the business-as-usual baseline only with respect to some aspects of one case.
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Voluntary Approaches Revisited
Although policy evaluation is never straightforward, it is especially challenging with respect to voluntary programs for several reasons apparent above. First, because participation is voluntary, claims of benefits beyond the business-as-usual standard can be viewed with less confidence, because firms may be signing on only to do what they would have done anyway. Second, measure-
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ment of rates of compliance and environmental benefits can be more difficult because voluntary agreements are seldom backed by legal mechanisms to compel disclosure. Finally, strategic behavior may present a problem. To the extent that participation in voluntary programs is motivated by a desire to avoid regulations, firms would have incentives to exaggerate claims of economic and environmental benefits of voluntary programs.
The one clear area of consensus among studies of voluntary approaches is that there has been too little attention to evaluation of either economic or environmental benefits (Storey 1996; Davies and Mazurek 1996; NRC 1997; EEA 1997; Beardsley 1996) . In part, this reflects the novelty of voluntary approaches; it is simply too early to assess effectiveness in many cases. However, it also reflects a pathology of unclear targets and inattention to the kinds of monitoring, verification, and public reporting needed to support program evaluation. A review of 137 voluntary agreements by the European Commission found that only two-thirds (90) had any requirements for monitoring and that provisions concerning verification by public authorities were included in just over half (70) . Only 19 of 137 European agreements provided for public reporting of results. The Commission (1997, 62) thus concluded that "The most important deficiency of voluntary agreements . . . is the lack of adequate voluntary agreement performance tracking (environmental reporting), accountability and transparency provisions." The 33/50 program is a noteworthy exception, but one that is probably due in large part to the concurrent regulatory requirements for reporting of discharges.
Cost Effectiveness
With respect to claims of greater cost effectiveness for business, participants in five of six case studies conducted by the European Environmental Agency reported that negotiated agreements were cost effective. However, the Agency (1997) concluded that "There is hardly any empirical literature providing evidence on the cost-effectiveness of Environmental Agreements." No analyses of the cost effectiveness to government of voluntary agreements relative to regulation were encountered by the author.
Democratic Accountability and Participation
Participants in most voluntary approaches emphasize improvements in the relationship between business and government (Beardsley et al. 1997; EEA 1997) . However, at the same time, there is evidence that cooperation has been achieved at the expense of opportunities for more widespread participation. The European Commission (1997) found that environmental groups participated in only 27 of 137 agreements they reviewed and labor in only 15. Third parties appear to have been involved in only two voluntary programs discussed here, and in both cases the resulting agreements were concluded after they withdrew in protest. Addressing this concern may not be a simple matter of adding chairs around the bargaining table, because participants in at least some negotiations stress that agreement was facilitated by the exclusion of environmental groups (Beardsley 1996, 13; European Commission 1997, Annex 5, 31) .
Environmental Protection
As noted above, there is limited evidence of environmental effectiveness. Although the two challenge programs considered, 33/50 and ARET, appear promising at first glance, it is not clear what proportion, if any, of the reductions achieved relative to base years are in fact attributable to these programs. This is reinforced by Storey's (1996, 29) conclusion that no discernable benefits were attributable to the U.S. Department of Energy's voluntary CE-189 program to promote energy efficiency over and above the improvements that were driven by market forces. The limited potential of positive challenge programs should come as no great surprise. In the absence of an explicit or implied threat of regulation or sanctions, challenge programs at best offer some measure of recognition to marginally enhance existing market incentives to reduce discharges. In other words, those that choose to participate will be the ones that would have reduced their discharges anyway.
There is even less evidence with which to evaluate the environmental effectiveness of voluntary agreements. With respect to the anticipated benefits, little can be said about the speed of implementation and higher rates of compli-
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ance anticipated relative to regulation. The European Environmental Agency (1997) also concluded that it was impossible to draw general conclusions about the benefits of voluntary agreements in stimulating innovation, a key consideration in industrial ecology.
It is noteworthy that many voluntary programs discussed here involved creation of business networks either across a large sector, as with the Dutch covenants, or encompassing several sectors, as with ARET, thus offering potential for technology transfer and integrated strategies. Many European voluntary agreements target waste reduction and thus extend networks across all or part of the product life cycle. The benefits of this approach have yet to be documented, however. While the results of the Dutch packaging covenant are promising, German voluntary agreements on product-related waste have not fared as well. In part, this reflects the absence from these voluntary networks of one critical element of the product chain-consumers-who were unwilling to accept reformulated products or to bring their waste to central depots (European Commission 1997, Annex 5, 22) . Moreover, although such networks may encourage technology transfer, concerns have also been raised that the collusive nature of some product recovery agreements may hinder competition and innovation (European Commission 1997, Annex 5, 29) .
The characteristics of the agreements themselves provide considerable cause for concern regarding their environmental effectiveness. Most voluntary agreements in Europe are nonbinding (86 of 137 studied by the European Commission) and few provide for verification and public reporting. The vast majority (110 of 137) contain no provisions concerning free riders, yet there is evidence of less than full participation in virtually all programs reviewed here. Indeed, the low rate of participation, particularly by small-to medium-sized enterprises, has led some industry sectors in Europe to call for field-leveling regulation (EEA 1997) . Concerns about free ridership have prompted some authors to emphasize that voluntary agreements or codes are more likely to be effective if there is a relatively small number of partners or stable well-organized trade associations and if compliance costs are manageable and evenly distributed across the sector (EEA 1997; Office of Consumer Affairs 1998).
It is extremely difficult to assess whether government cooptation by business resulted in weaker standards in voluntary agreements. However, Rennings and colleagues (1997, 247) conclude based on their analysis of German agreements that "For the government side the price for an agreement often consists in reducing the announced level of environmental protection. . . . [A]s the case studies in connection with this study bear out, a 'decrease in the stringency of regulations' is always observable." The fact that voluntary agreements often lack clear targets, reporting requirements, and deadlines (EEA 1997) lends support to this conclusion. The extreme flexibility of the ARET program with respect to base lines is also indicative of a compromise by government, because it is difficult to conceive of a regulatory program with such uncertain requirements.
Implicit in this discussion is the question of what motivates business to participate in voluntary environmental programs. Storey (1996) has argued that nonbinding approaches are more likely to be effective when the actions being promoted are already in firms' economic self-interest. However, a strong threat of regulation and binding agreements are critical if that is not the case. In other words, if the donkey has its own reasons to pull the cart, ear stroking and gentle persuasion should not be problematic (although they may not add much). However, if it is not the ear stroking so much as the implied threat of the stick that is motivating the donkey, maintaining a credible threat of the stick is essential (Glachant 1994) .
There is reason to believe that the latter scenario is more common. A survey by the European Commission found that the potential to forgo or postpone regulation was cited as the most important benefit of voluntary environmental agreements by roughly two-thirds of industry respondents (European Commission 1997) . In Canada, KPMG (1994) reported that 95% of firms cited "compliance with regulations" as one of the top five factors motivating their environmental improvements. The next most frequently cited factor at 69% was directors' liability, whereas factors such as cost savings, cus-
tomer requirements, and public pressure were all cited by less than half of respondents. This suggests that government coercion, rather than market forces, remains the most important factor driving firms to improve their environmental performance. In this regard, there is much to be said for the Dutch approach of negotiating implementation rather than policy objectives, because the clearer and firmer government is with respect to its policy objectives at the outset, the more credible the threat of the stick.
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A government committed to a cooperative approach thus must strike a delicate balance between demonstrating a commitment to negotiations and maintaining a credible threat of withdrawal and regulation. Ironically, the very fact of a government embracing voluntary approaches may undermine their effectiveness. As Rennings and colleagues (1997, 253) note, "A binding commitment giving priority to cooperative solutions can deprive the instrument of voluntary agreements of the basis for effective environmental policy improvements." They conclude that the German government's promise not to impose additional taxes on disposal of old cars undermined its bargaining position with the automobile industry. Similarly, Chang and colleagues (1998) attribute the failure of Ontario's voluntary agreement to promote municipal recycling programs through industry subsidies to relaxation of the threat of regulation after election of a government openly committed to deregulation. Socolow (1994, 12) has asserted that from the industrial ecology perspective, "Industry demonstrates that environmental objectives are no longer alien, to be resisted and then accommodated reluctantly. Rather, these objectives are part of the fabric of production, like worker safety and consumer satisfaction." The KPMG survey results suggest that although that may be true today of the environmental leaders within industry, it does not characterize the rank and file. Government thus has a critical role to play in ensuring that industry in fact has sufficient incentives to serve as an "agent of change."
Combining Policy Instruments
The importance of binding commitments and legal threats is supported by the widespread conclusion that voluntary programs work best in combination with other policy instruments, such as regulation and market-based instruments, which encourage participation and reduce the threat of free ridership (Beardsley 1996; European Commission 1996 Davies and Mazurek 1996; Rennings et al. 1997) . The European Environmental Agency (1997) concluded that "Wherever environmental improvement was noted, the Environmental Agreement was accompanied by other measures or incentives." However, this begs the question of just what kind of relationship between voluntary programs and laws is most effective. Incorporating voluntary agreements in legally binding contracts or statutory permits is quite different from passing baseline regulations to prevent free riding, because the former only apply to those who enter into voluntary agreements, whereas the latter apply equally to all. Accompanying regulations may in fact be a mixed blessing. On one hand, they can prevent free riding. However, on the other hand, in making explicit the government's expectations for minimally acceptable performance, they undermine the threat of regulation that motivates firms to comply with more stringent negotiated agreements. One is left to wonder to what extent the apparent environmental benefits of voluntary approaches backed by regulations are in fact due to the regulations.
Conclusion
It is impossible to draw overarching conclusions about the effectiveness of cooperative approaches to environmental protection because the form and context of those approaches differ so greatly. Even among voluntary approaches, there are significant differences between a program like the flexible 33/50 challenge and the Dutch approach of negotiated legally binding implementation agreements. With respect to voluntary approaches at least, it is also difficult to draw conclusions about effectiveness because so few rigorous program evaluations are available. Indeed, it is quite remarkable how little we know about the environmental effectiveness of voluntary programs, although that has not stopped some proponents of cooperative approaches from
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drawing positive conclusions. 13 The paucity of evaluations reflects not only the novelty of these approaches but also inadequate attention to policy evaluation by those responsible for policy design and implementation. Given the inherent challenges of evaluating voluntary programs, a commitment to measurement and evaluation from the outset is particularly critical. As Davies and Mazurek (1996, 67) conclude, "In the absence of such evaluation, judgments about the program[s] will be based on politics and the skills of the spin doctors-not an effective basis for making public policy." Proponents of cooperative regulatory reforms must apply the same rigorous standards of review to their reform proposals that they demand that regulators apply to traditional regulatory proposals. As Leiss and Associates (1996) argues, "It is up to the proponents of voluntarism to show that their approach can achieve as much or more than regulatory action."
An empirically grounded understanding of what works and what does not can only emerge from a self-conscious research agenda. Recent efforts by the U.S. EPA to develop methods to measure policy effectiveness, the dependent variable, are thus commendable. The forgoing discussion suggests a number of independent variables that warrant greater attention, including whether a program is regulatory or voluntary (and if the latter whether voluntary commitments are legally binding), its relationship to other policies such as regulations and marketbased instruments, who participates, whether goals or means to achieve them are the issue, economic characteristics of the industrial sector in question, and sociopolitical context.
The goal of environmental sustainability clearly demands creative solutions beyond the regulatory approaches on which we have relied to date. Yet, however justified our frustration with traditional policy instruments, we should not rush to embrace new ones simply on faith. The challenge for those in the industrial ecology and policy analysis communities is to move beyond the assertion that industry must become an "agent of change" to develop a deeper understanding of which policy instruments provide the most effective incentives for both industry leaders and laggards to do just that.
curred before the 33/50 program was announced in early 1991, constituting roughly one-third of reductions from 1988 to 1994 (i.e., (1494-1262)/ (1494/737)). However, uncertainty is introduced by the fact that the TRI data are in fact total annual discharges rather than point estimates at the end of the year. Thus, an unknown fraction of the reductions from the 1990 to 1991 TRI reports also would have occurred before the introduction of the program. 6. The calculation is 19% of the 1990 transfers and releases of 33/50 chemicals by participants divided by the total 1990 transfers and releases of 33/50 chemicals or 0.19(751)/1262 (data in table 1). Although Davies and Mazurek (1996, 18) attribute the full 19% reduction relative to the 1990 reference year to the 33/50 challenge, that figure is relative to releases and transfers only from participating firms, not total 1991 releases and transfers. 7. I am indebted to Mark Atlas for this point. 8. As with reliance on TRI data to evaluate the 33/ 50 program, this is a relatively generous interpretation because some fraction of the reductions made between the 1993 and 1994 NPRI reporting years for the National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI) would have been made before the ARET program was announced. 9. Gallon (1998) notes that the 90% reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions claimed by the International Nickel Company (INCO's) Sudbury smelter under the ARET program were in fact legally mandated. 10. The number of enforcement staff and prosecutions both rose by roughly one-third from 1991 to 1992 alone (Ministry of Housing 1997). 11. The EEA report analyzed "environmental agreements," which were more broadly defined than voluntary agreements are here. Thus, the case studies included two statute or regulation-driven programs, a Swedish packaging program and enforcement of Portuguese pulp mill regulations, which would not qualify as voluntary according to the typology presented here. In addition to the German global warming declaration, discussed above, EEA (1997) reported that the Netherlands covenant with the chemical industry had yielded significant reductions relative to the 1992 reference year and relative to the historical baseline, although the potential impact of concurrent regulatory reforms was not considered. No data were available to evaluate a Danish agreement concerning recycling of transport packaging or a French agreement on end-of-life vehicles.
12. The distinction between negotiating goals and means in practice is blurred, however, because policy objectives can be set with varying degrees of specificity, from ambient environmental quality objectives, to total environmental burden, to discharges from different sectors, to discharges limits or even control practices for individual sources. The more specific government is with respect to its objectives, the stronger its position in negotiations with industry. However, as critics of command and control regulation have noted, excessive specificity can sacrifice opportunities to capture efficiency gains from negotiations. 13. For instance, Beardsley (1996, 3) states that "A conclusion here may be that confrontation and litigation have outlived their usefulness, and that civilized negotiation is becoming a more effective problem-solving tool," but in the next sentence adds that "Regarding environmental quality benefits, results are much more speculative principally because there is so little data."
